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T h e  c u r r e n t  d e b a t e  a b o u t  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  
a n i m a l s  h a s  b r o k e n  d o w n  i n t o  t h e  u s u a l  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  
c o n t e m p o r a r y  m o r a l  d e b a t e .  O n  o n e  s i d e  a r e  t h e  
d e o n t o l o g i s t s  l i k e  T o m  R e g a n  a n d ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r ,  
u t i l i t a r i a n s  l i k e  P e t e r  S i n g e r .  O n  t h e  f a c e  o f  i t ,  i t  
w o u l d  s e e m  t h a t  t h e  d e o n t o l o g i s t  w h o  i s  i n t e n t  o n  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  i m m o r a l i t y  o f  p r e s e n t  m o d e s  o f  
a n i m a l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  w o u l d  h a v e  t h e  t o u g h e r  r o w  t o  
h o e .  M o s t  d e o n t o l o g i s t s  s e e m  t o  h a v e  f o l l o w e d  
K a n t ' s  l e a d  i n  d e n y i n g  n o n h u m a n  a n i m a l s  
m e m b e r s h i p  i n  t h e  k i n g d o m  o f  e n d s .  W h a t e v e r  
m i n i m a l  s t a t u s  t h e y  h a v e  h a s  g e n e r a l l y  b e e n  v i e w e d  
a s  e n t i r e l y  d e r i v a t i v e  f r o m  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  h u m a n s  
w h o ,  a l o n e  a m o n g  a n i m a l s ,  h a v e  d i r e c t  m e m b e r s h i p  
i n  t h e  m o r a l  c o m m u n i t y .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  a n y  a t t e m p t  
s u c h  a s  R e g a n ' s  t o  e l e v a t e  a n i m a l s  a b o v e  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
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Utilitarianism~ (;onscience and Animals 
mere means to human ends will entail a major 
readjustment of the tradi tional deontological 
conceptions of rights and duties. 
On the other hand, utilitarians like Singer have 
tradition on their side. Since Bentham, utilitarians 
have recognized that animals have direct status as 
members in the moral community because of either 
their ability to feel pain or their apparent desire not 
to be in pain. The simple feeling of pain is enough 
for hedonistic utilitarians, and the presence of an 
interest in not being caused pain is enough for 
preference utilitarians. So it would appear. 
What I will argue is that things are not so simple. 
When fully grounded in utilitarian theory, I think 
the issue of the status of animals (and other marginal 
entities like fetuses) is irresolvably problematic. For 
reasons I will only touch upon, things are much more 
problematic for the preference utilitarian than for 
the hedonist. But even the most straightforward 
hedonism will entail no clear position on the moral 
status of animals (and certain kinds of humans). 
My aim is not simply to sow confusion. I take it as 
a mark of a good moral theory that it can recognize 
hard cases and, moreover, can explain why they are 
so hard. As a utilitarian, lam therefore 
uncomfortable with the idea that utilitarianism 
delivers an easy verdict on issues as profoundly 
confusing as the status of animals, fetuses, severely 
disabled humans and so on. There are other, more 
directly utilitarian reasons for being relieved that 
there is so much unavoidable confusion about things 
like animals and fetuses. I will return to these at the 
end of the paper. 
The motivation for making this issue more 
theoretically complicated than has been usual is also 
founded on the inadequacy of the criteria used in 
simpler arguments. As for the preference 
utilitarianism of Singer, there are, first of all, pressing 
concerns about the coherence of the theory itself.! 
More immediate, however, is the problem of 
inferring that animals have a desire or preference not 
to be in pain. This inference of mental states from 
behavior can only be of comfort to those already 
convinced that animals are cognitively complicated 
enough to count as moral agents. To the 
unconvinced the inference is bound to look like so 
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much question begging. They will simply deny that 
cows have anything as complicated as beliefs and 
desires going on in their bovine "minds." Do rats 
even know when they are in pain? Do chickens know 
anything at all? 
Things are a little more promlsmg for the 
hedonist. Even the most persistent human 
chauvinist will go so far as to admit that animals feel 
pain. But once again, using sentience as a criterion 
will not do the work the animalliberationist wantsjt 
to do. Given that they feel pain, one can still wonder 
how important it is to them that they not feel it. Is it 
important enough to override our well-articulated 
desires to skin, eat and experiment on them? Also, if 
their overall life as farm or lab animals can be made 
just barely to net a small amount of pleasure, would 
that warrant our present use of them? Moreover, 
would that compel us to bring more of them into our 
exploitive realm, since that marginal balance of 
pleasure over pain would not exist were it not for our 
desire to exploit them? Finally, would the use of 
painless slaughter techniques satisfy a Singer or a 
Salt? 
It is in the responses of the animalliberationist to 
the last rwo questions that we find the inadequacy of 
a straightforward use of the sentience criterion. It is 
here also where the deontologist is given an opening 
to press for the inadequacy of the utilitarian defense 
of animals. It is not really the simple balance of pain 
against pleasure that matters here. It is rather our 
typical disregard for animals and our belief that their 
lives are baSically less important than ours that 
disturbs the animal liberationist. The real problem is 
that they are viewed as mere means to our ends, that 
they have no value and no respect as ends in 
themselves. 
I don't doubt that the sentience criterion could be 
given a better run for its money than I have given. 
But I would beg the indulgence of the defensive 
utilitarian until I have completed my argument. 
As I see it, the issue of animals is much more 
directly connected to the justification of utilitarianism 
than it is to the application of the theory. Utilitarians 
from Plato (at least the Plato who wrote Protagoras) 
to Mill to Brandt have always thought that the 
Thrasymachuses of the world deserved a 
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Utllitarianism~ C o n s c i c n c e  a n d  A n i m a l s  
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  a n s w e r  t o  t h e i r  d e m a n d  f o r  a  r e a s o n  
t o  b e  m o r a l .  I t  c o m e s  i n  t h r e e  s t a g e s .  T h e  f i r s t  l i n e  o f  
a r g u m e n t  c o n t e n d s  t h a t  o n e  s h o u l d  b e  m o r a l  ( w h i c h  
f o r  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  m e a n s ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  t h a t  o n e  s h o u l d  
b e  b e n e v o l e n t )  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  e x t e r n a l  
s a n c t i o n s .  A n y  a c t  o f  i m m o r a l i t y  i s  l i k e l y  t o  c a t c h  u p  
w i t h  y o u .  T h i s  a r g u m e n t  c o u l d  o n l y  s a t i s f y  t h e  
h o p e l e s s l y  d u l l ,  h o w e v e r .  A n y  o f  u s  w h o  h a v e  e v e r  
d o n e  s o m e t h i n g  w r o n g  a n d  g o t t e n  a w a y  w i t h  i t  
( w h i c h  i s  m o s t  o f  u s )  h a v e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  g r o u n d s  f o r  
r e j e c t i n g  t h e  a r g u m e n t .  
T h e  n e x t  l i n e  o f  d e f e n s e  i s  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  o n e  
s h o u l d  b e  m o r a l  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  i n t e r n a l  
s a n c t i o n s ,  b e c a u s e  o f  g u i l t  b r o u g h t  o n  b y  c o n s c i e n c e .  
B u t  w h y  w o r r y  a b o u t  g u i l t ?  W h y  h a v e  a  c o n s c i e n c e ?  
A f t e r  a l l ,  i f  I  a m  a n  e g o i s t  w a i t i n g  f o r  a  r e a s o n  t o  b e  
m o r a l ,  m y  c o n s c i e n c e  o u g h t  t o  m a k e  m e  f e e l  g u i l t y  
a b o u t  n o t  b e i n g  s e l f i s h .  
T h i s  b r i n g s  u s  t o  t h e  t h i r d  s t a g e  o f  t h e  r e s p o n s e .  
C o n s c i e n c e  i s  n o t  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  N o r  
f o r  a l m o s t  a l l  u t i l i t a r i a n s ,  i s  i t  i n n a t e  ( a l t h o u g h  t h e  
s o c i o b i o l o g i s t s  m i g h t  s o m e d a y  c o n v i n c e  u s  t h a t  i t  i s ) .  
C o n s c i e n c e  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  p r o g r a m m i n g .  A n d  l i k e  
a l l  e f f e c t s  o f  b e h a v i o r a l  p r o g r a m m i n g ,  i t  c a n  b e  
e x t i n g u i s h e d .  S o  w h y  f e a r  t h e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  
c o n s c i e n c e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n  i t  k e e p s  g e t t i n g  i n  t h e  
w a y  o f  m y  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ?  B e c a u s e  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  p u r e  
f a c t ,  i n  a n  a d v a n c e d  c i v i l i z a t i o n  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  s o  
i n t e r m i n g l e d ,  s o  i n t e r d e p e n d e n t ,  t h a t  a n y o n e  w h o  
l o s e s  a  b e n e v o l e n t  c o n s c i e n c e  a n d  d e v e l o p s  a  
n a r r o w l y  e g o i s t i c  " c o u r s e  o f  l i f e "  ( a s  M i l l  c a l l e d  i t )  
w i l l  s u r e l y  p a y  f o r  i t .  T h e  v i c e s  o f  n a i v e  e g o i s m  h a v e  
a n  a d d i c t i v e  q u a l i t y  a b o u t  t h e m ,  a n d  o n c e  t h e  f r a g i l e  
b a r r i e r  o f  c o n s c i e n c e  d i s s o l v e s ,  n o t h i n g  w i l l  s a v e  u s  
f r o m  t h e  t y r a n n y  o f  e x c e s s .  T h e r e  i s  a  p r i c e  t o  b e  
p a i d  f o r  n o t  g e n e r a l i z i n g  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  o n e ' s  o w n  
i n t e r e s t s  i n t o  c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  o t h e r  
b e i n g s  w h o  a r e  m o r e  o r  l e s s  l i k e  o n e s e l f  a n d  w h o  
h a v e  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  a r e  m o r e  o r  l e s s  s y n o n y m o u s  w i t h  
v a r i o u s  o f  o n e ' s  o w n  i n t e r e s t s .  
S o  i t  i s  c o n s c i e n c e  t h a t  s a v e s  u s  f r o m  o u r s e l v e s  
a n d  f r o m  e a c h  o t h e r .  B u t  h o w  d o e s  i t  s a v e  a n i m a l s  
f r o m  u s ?  I t  s a v e s  t h e m  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  w h i c h  i t  a r i s e s .  C o n s c i e n c e  i s  
f o r m e d  a s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  p a s s e s  f r o m  t e a c h e r  t o  
t e a c h e r  i n  a  s o c i e t y  o f  m o r a l  t e a c h e r s  w h o  f i n d  i t  
a d v a n t a g e o u s  t o  i m p o s e  c o n c e r n  f o r  o t h e r s  ( t h e  
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t e a c h e r s )  o n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  A s  o n e  e n c o u n t e r s  
t e a c h e r s  w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g l y  d i f f e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  
t h e  r a n g e  o f  t h i n g s  o n e  o u g h t  t o  b e  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  
g r o w s .  B u t  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  c o n s c i e n c e  i s  
c o m p l i c a t e d ,  e m o t i v e l y  a n d  l o g i c a l l y .  A t  t h e  e m o t i v e  
l e v e l  t h e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  c o n c e r n  i s  c o n s t r a i n e d  b y  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a s  b e i n g s  b e c o m e  l e s s  l i k e  u s ,  t h e  
r a t i o n a l  e g o i s t i c  g r o u n d s  f o r  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  t h e m  
b e c o m e  w e a k e r .  M y  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  h i g h l y  
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  w i t h  t h o s e  o f  m y  f a m i l y  a n d  
c o l l e a g u e s .  T h i s  c o m m o n  s e n s e  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  
l e s s e n s  a s  I  c o n s i d e r  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  m e  o f  
A m e r i c a n s  i n  g e n e r a l ,  E t h i o p i a n s ,  f e t u s e s ,  m a m m a l s ,  
b i r d s  a n d  s o  o n .  I n  f a c t ,  a s  b e i n g s  b e c o m e  l e s s  l i k e  
m e ,  I  w i l l  f i n d  n o t  o n l y  t h a t  m y  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  n o t  
s y n o n y m o u s  w i t h  t h e i r s  b u t  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  
t h e i r s .  A t  t h e  o u t e r  l i m i t s  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  b e i n g s  l i k e  
f e t u s e s  a n d  c h i c k e n s  m i g h t  s e e m  t o  b e  p r o d u c t i v e  o f  
n o t h i n g  b u t  n e e d l e s s  g u i l t ,  w h i c h  m u s t  b e  o f  c o n c e r n  
t o  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  c o n t e m p l a t i n g  t h e  o p t i m a l  
a r r a n g e m e n t  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  l a w s .  
A t  t h e  l o g i c a l  l e v e l  t h e  h i t c h  c o m e s  i n  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  c r i t e r i a  u n d e r  w h i c h  b e i n g s  c o u n t  o r  d o n ' t  
c o u n t  a s  " e n o u g h  l i k e  m e "  t o  w a r r a n t  m y  r e s p e c t  a n d  
b e n e v o l e n c e .  N o  c r i t e r i o n  i s  g o i n g  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  t o  
i n c l u d e  e v e r y t h i n g  a n y  g i v e n  i n d i v i d u a l  h a s  c o m e  t o  
a c c e p t  a s  " e n o u g h  l i k e  m e "  a n d  e x c l u d e  e v e r y t h i n g  
t h a t  i s  n o r  " e n o u g h  l i k e  m e "  t o  c o u n t .  C r i t e r i a  t h a t  
i n c l u d e  m a m m a l s  b u t  e x c l u d e  h u m a n  f e t u s e s  w i l l  b e  
h a r d  f o r  v e g e t a r i a n  f e m i n i s t s  t o  d e f e n d .  C r i t e r i a  t h a t  
i n c l u d e  f e t u s e s  b u t  e x c l u d e  c h i m p s  w i l l  b e  h a r d  f o r  
m e a t e a t i n g  a n t i a b o r t i o n i s t s  t o  d e f e n d .  C r i t e r i a  t h a t  
i n c l u d e  r e d w o o d s  b u t  e x c l u d e  p u m p k i n s  w i l l  c a u s e  
t r o u b l e  f o r  v e g e t a r i a n s  w h o  a r e  a l s o  v e r y  r a d i c a l  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s .  
T h i s  b r i n g s  u s  t o  m y  b a s i c  p o i n t :  i t  i s ,  I  t h i n k ,  a  
v e r y  g o o d  t h i n g  t h a t  w e  a r e  u n a b l e  t o  s e t t l e  u p o n  
a n y  w i d e l y  a c c e p t e d  c r i t e r i o n  t h a t  w o u l d  n i c e l y  
e x c l u d e  a n i m a l s  o r  f e t u s e s  f r o m  t h e  m o r a l  
c o m m u n i t y .  T h e  b r o a d  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  a n y  s u c h  
c r i t e r i o n  w o u l d ,  a s  a n i m a l  l i b e r a t i o n i s t s  a n d  
a n t i a b o r t i o n i s t s  a r e  q u i c k  t o  p o i n t  o u t ,  l e a d  t o  t h e  
e x c l u s i o n  o f  m a n y  h u m a n s  f r o m  t h e  m o r a l  
c o m m u n i t y .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  i m p l a u s i b i l i t y  o f  a n y  r i g i d  
c r i t e r i o n  i s  g r e a t  f o d d e r  f o r  r a c i s t s ,  s e x i s t s  a n d  f a s c i s t s  
w h o  w i l l  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  n o t i o n  o f  e q u a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  h u m a n  i n t e r e s t s  i s  a  m y t h  w i t h  n o  
l o g i c a l  s u p p o r t .  T h e  g e n e r a l  h a b i t  o f  d r e a m i n g  u p  
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Utilitarianism~ Conscience and Animals 
membership qualifications for the moral community 
is from a utilitarian and from a purely human 
perspective very dangerous. I t is fortunate indeed that 
we are totally confused about hew seriously the 
suffering of animals and fetuses should be taken. 
Should we be as concerned about fetuses and cows as 
we are about our pets or even our children? Or 
should we be as unconcerned about them as we are 
about creatures as dissimilar to us as ants and snail 
darters? 
However we answer these questions, I would 
contend that our answer really will not be derived 
from any rationally grounded criterion. Rather, it 
will be grounded in the intricacies of conscience 
formation, in millions of "intuitions" turned out by 
millions of behavioral histories. These kinds of issues 
bring us to the emotive edge of applied ethics. Issues 
like euthanasia for competent adults, regulation of 
business, and taxation policy are much nearer to the 
cognitive surface. In these cases agreement with the· 
basic tenets of classical utilitarianism will leave 
mostly factual issues to argue about. 
As far as any social policy about the status of 
animals or fetuses is concerned, however, there is 
reason to believe that the function of moral 
philosophy is primarily critical and destructive. It 
should seek, for good utilitarian reasons, to muddy 
any clear water others claim to find. There are clear 
utilitarian costs to humans if we manage to muster 
agreement that animals and fetuses count as 
importantly as people, but there are also considerable 
costs to humans in establishing some clear criterion 
that excludes the lives of animals and fetuses from 
being morally important. 
Thus, I think the most prudent course for human 
social policy is the current status quo. Individuals 
should be allowed to follow their own consciences 
on the matters of abortion, vegetarianism and animal 
experimentation. But they should do so in the 
knowledge that the spectacles of truckloads of 
fetuses, marginally profitable barbarity to livestock 
and frivolous animal experimentation will not be 
without consequences for social policy. Such 
spectacles are bound to affect the sensibilities of 
quite moderate people who have not had to develop 
the numbness to suffering and death of the 
physician, butcher or vivisector. 
On the bottom line I have come to a position 
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more or less equivalent to one recently advocated by 
Jan Narveson. My reasons for arriving at this bottom 
line are quite different from his, however. Arguing 
from a contractarian perspective, Narveson nails the 
issue down to the following Hobbesian 
consideration: 
The fact, for instance, that if I were a pig, I 
would want pigs... to be treated well is of no 
interest, ... the pig himself has no rational clout. 
He is not able to address himself to the 
question of what he can do to make life 
difficult for us if we don't cater to his needs, or 
of how much better he could make it for us if 
we do. If we want something out of the pig, and 
treating the pig well is necessary for getting it, 
then we shall have reason to treat him well. If 
we don't, however, or it isn't, then why should 
we go to the trouble?2 
The problems with this kind of prisoner's dilemma 
ethic are well-known and have been since 
Braithewaite's Game Theory as a Tool for the Moral 
Philosopher was reviewed in the 1950's.3 If threat 
advantage is a necessary condi tion for moral 
consideration, then one wonders about the 
consequences of substituting "Ethiopian" for "pig" in 
the above argument. If, on the other hand, it is some 
kind of sufficient condition, then do grizzlies have 
more status than Ethiopians? 
At any rate, the point I have tried to make is that 
the welfare of animals is of concern to humans. And 
although confusion about their status may be viewed 
as only instrumentally valuable in the development 
of social policy, questions about their intrinsic value 
cannot be pushed aside as Narveson or anyone else 
may want to do. But no matter how hard we try, the 
issue of how much we ought to be concerned about 
the suffering of animals is - and ought to be ­
impossible to settle on rational grounds. 0 
~ 
lSee my "Plato's Democratic Man and the Implausibility of 
Preference Utilitarianism," forthcoming in Theory and Decision. 
2"On a Case for Animals' Rights" Monist, 70, Jan. 87 (31-49) 
p.42. 
3Cambridge University Press (1955). For a discussion see R. D. 
Luce and H. Raiffu, Games and Decisions. (New York: Wiley and 
Sons, 1957), pp. 145-150. 
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